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ABSTRACT
Reconstruction and development in poor, fragile countries present a double challenge: tackling the issues of
poverty and underdevelopment as well as the constraints posed by instability, poor governance, and weak
capacity. This context generates a range of problems that include: insecurity, insufficient planning, inadequate
implementation capacity, poor financial management, misprocurement, corruption, a volatile fiscal environment,
ineffective donor coordination, and negative environmental and social impacts. The paper draws lessons from
positive and negative experiences in meeting these challenges in three conflict- and/or disaster-affected cases:
Aceh Province, Indonesia (postdisaster reconstruction and postconflict development following the tsunami and
earthquakes of 2004), Haiti (postdisaster recovery following the earthquake of 2010), and South Sudan
(postconflict development following independence in 2011). These lessons are then organized in an assessment
framework of risks and mitigation measures to assist academics and practitioners to understand and address the
challenges of reconstruction and development in fragile states.
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1. WHAT IS THE CHALLENGE OF
RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT IN
FRAGILE STATES?
This paper is an effort to guide practitioners and
theoreticians to understand and address the
challenge of reconstruction and development in
fragile states. The first section provides a brief
review of the literature on fragile and conflictaffected states in the developing world. The
following section draws on the author’s experiences
with reconstruction and/or development in three
fragile contexts: the province of Aceh in Indonesia,
Haiti, and South Sudan. The final section presents a
risk assessment and mitigation framework that
draws lessons from both the literature and individual
experience as a useful instrument to promote
recovery, growth, and poverty reduction in situations
of fragility and conflict.
A first step is to define what we mean by fragility.
While there is no standard definition of fragility, the
most commonly referenced meaning is provided by
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD): “a state with weak capacity
to carry out the basic state functions of governing a
population and its territory and that lacks the ability
or political will to develop mutually constructive and
reinforcing relations with society” (OECD, 2007).
Fragility is, in fact, a continuum with violent conflict
and/or complete state failure on one end and
varying degrees of poor governance and/or violence

at
different
points
along
the
(Agborsangaya-Fiteu & Wam, 2009).

continuum

When applying this definition, at least a quarter of
the world’s people live in fragile and conflict-affected
situations (Asian Development Bank [ADB], 2012;
World Bank, 2013c). As these can occur both at the
level of the state as well as the subnational level,
the ADB has characterized four types of situations:
fragility, conflict, transitional status, and subnational
fragility and/or conflict (ibid). The annex to this
paper provides a current listing of states with such
situations. All but three of these states are amongst
the most poverty-stricken (per capita incomes below
$1,205 per year), thus making them eligible for
concessional financing from the International
Development Association and other development
agencies.
Recent research has focused on the linkages
between poverty and fragility (Collier, 2007) as well
as violence (World Bank, 2011). Seventy percent of
fragile states have experienced some form of
violent conflict since 1989 while poverty rates in
these states average 54% as compared with 22%
for all low-income countries (World Bank, 2013c).
Fragile states have not benefited from the global
decline in poverty, and the share of the world’s poor
living in fragile states has increased (Kharas &
Rogerson, 2012).
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Beyond these sad numerical relationships, what
else do we know about the dynamics of fragility and
development? The UK Department of International
Development recently conducted a review of
research on governance and fragile states
undertaken during the first decade of this century.
The synthesis notes that the inability to prevent
conflict or provide basic services takes a human toll,
prevents generations of households from escaping
poverty, and traps countries in a cycle of aid
dependency. It draws four main conclusions: (1)
stakeholder participation helps to both improve
service provision and build more effective,
accountable governments; (2) security is a
precondition for development; (3) conflict is more
likely in situations where there are high levels of
inequity between different religious and ethnic
groups; and (4) effective taxation policies are critical
to build viable states that can move beyond aid
dependence (DFID Research and Evidence
Division, 2010).
Table 1. Areas of intervention for conflict prevention and
peacebuilding
Socioeconomic
Development

Good
Governance

Reform of
Justice &
Security
Institutions

Culture of
Truth,
Justice,
Reconciliati
on

Balanced
physical
reconstruction

Civil society
development

Security
sector
reform
(police,
military,
intelligence)

Enhancing
nonviolent
dispute
resolution
systems

Sound and
equitable
economic
management
Equitable
distribution of
development
benefits

Freedoms of
expression,
association,
press
Media
development

Small arms
and light
weapons
reduction

Power sharing

Dialogue
among
conflicting
groups

Gender equality

Participatory
processes

Nonviolent
accompanim
ent

Prejudice
reduction or
diversity
training

Equitable access
to services

Improved
access

Community
policing

Trauma
healing

Repatriation/reint
egration of
displaced
persons

Democratizatio
n

Peacekeepi
ng

Conflict
resolution
skills training

Electoral
processes

Nonviolent
observers

Transparency
and
accountability

Disarmamen
t,
demobilizati
on and
reintegration
of excombatants

Sustainable use
of (and equitable
access to natural
resources)

Anti-corruption
and good
governance
programs

Rule of law

Source: OECD, 2008, p. 2

Transitional
justice
War crimes
trials
Reparations

De-mining
Human rights
protection

Peace
education

The OECD’s Development Assistance Committee
has translated this and other findings into a
framework for responding to situations of fragility
and conflict along four dimensions: socioeconomic
development; good governance; reform of justice
and security institutions; and a culture of truth,
justice, and reconciliation. These are presented in
Table 1.
2. LESSONS FROM THREE EXAMPLES
This section draws on the author’s professional
experience working in three fragile contexts: Aceh
Province (Indonesia) from 2004–2009, Haiti from
2010–2014, and South Sudan from 2013–2014.
Aceh represents a hybrid case of reconstruction
following natural disasters and postconflict
development. Haiti focuses on postdisaster
recovery within a fragile state. South Sudan
portrays the development challenges in a
postconflict setting. Relevant lessons are drawn
from each case to inform the following section on
risk management. A caveat—these lessons are not
comprehensive or universal but rather drawn from
the author’s specific experiences stemming from
designing and/or managing multidonor funds in
each setting.
2.1. Aceh Province
The Indonesian province of Aceh was hit by a
massive earthquake (9.1 Richter scale) on
December 26, 2004, which unleashed a series of
tsunamis that destroyed much of the province and
had an impact throughout the Indian Ocean. An
estimated 230,000 people in 14 countries were
killed, millions were left homeless, and billions of
dollars in damages and losses were incurred.
Aceh suffered the brunt of this impact. There were
more than 120,000 fatalities, another 90,000 people
were missing, and nearly 500,000 survivors lost
their homes out of a provincial population of 4.25
million. The already fragile local government lost
3,000 civil servants, 2,275 were reported missing,
669 government buildings were destroyed, records
and databases were lost, and equipment was
destroyed (Government of Indonesia, 2005b).
Economic damages and losses amounted to US $5
billion, equivalent to 109% of provincial GDP
(Government of Indonesia, 2005a).
At the time of the disaster, Aceh was at the tail end
of a 30-year conflict between separatist rebels and
the central government that had claimed up to
25,000 lives, displaced over 400,000 people,
destroyed much of the productive sector,
undermined the delivery of basic services in many
areas, weakened institutions, eroded the social
fabric, traumatized a large portion of Acehnese
society, and created deep political fault lines
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between Aceh and Jakarta (Government of
Indonesia et al., 2009). Aceh had been under 18
months of martial law and civil emergency following
the collapse of peace negotiations between the
central government and the Free Aceh Movement.
The province was effectively closed to most
international aid agencies, with only the
International Committee of the Red Cross, the UN
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs,
and a small number of locally staffed NGOs
maintaining activities (Tsunami Evaluation Coalition
[TEC], 2007).
The author arrived in Indonesia about three months
before the earthquake and tsunami to serve as the
World Bank’s environment coordinator. I was
immediately
tasked
with
calculating
the
environmental damages and losses from the natural
disasters during the first two weeks of 2005. I was
then asked to outline the design of a multidonor
fund to help finance the reconstruction and ended
up managing the $650 million Multi-Donor Fund for
Aceh and Nias for its critical first 18 months of
operation.
I personally learned a series of lessons related to:
(1) addressing the financing gap between
reconstruction needs and immediately available
finance; (2) filling the gap between what is known
locally and internationally about reconstruction; (3)
accelerating the pace of recovery through
coordination, cooperation, and removal of barriers;
(4) strengthening institutions so that they are more
capable of managing the recovery; and (5)
improving governance by giving voice to
stakeholders in both recovery planning and
implementation (Leitmann, forthcoming). This final
section of the chapter characterizes each type of
value added and draws lessons for managing
partnerships.

•

Lessons
o

2.1.2. Filling the Knowledge Gap
When reality gets turned on its head after a disaster
or following a conflict, good information is at a
premium—it is needed urgently and it is hard to
obtain. Partnerships can help fill the knowledge gap
right from the outset with the preparation of a
Postdisaster (or Postconflict) Needs Assessment,
which now combines the ECLAC-style damage and
loss economic analysis with a more survey-based
approach to basic needs. During the reconstruction,
financial tracking combined with monitoring of a
results framework and/or reconstruction standards
can be used to gauge the ongoing performance
(efficiency and efficacy) of reconstruction activities
and the recovery program as a whole. Finally,
important knowledge can be generated for the
future by conducting a postreconstruction
evaluation to both assess final performance and
learn lessons for reducing the risk and responding
to future disasters.
•

Lessons
o

Build communities: The initial rush
to provide shelter can result in
rebuilding structures not
communities. In addition to
structures, attention must be paid to
local infrastructure (water,
sanitation, transport, electricity,
waste management), livelihoods,
and social and religious facilities.

o

Pick the right partners: Partners
should be chosen based on their
proven ability to deliver good
practices. Conversely,
inexperienced but perhaps wellfinanced partners can actually
reduce the quality and pace of
recovery.

2.1.1. Addressing the Financing Gap
One notable difference between recovery in lowincome countries and developed economies is the
lack of formal insurance coverage by households
and businesses. For example, about half of losses
resulting from Hurricane Andrew in Florida and the
Northridge earthquake in California were covered
by formal insurance, while less than 15% of losses
resulting from the Indian Ocean tsunami were
covered (Woodruff, de Mel, & McKenzie, 2010). In
the public sector in developing countries, very little
money is usually set aside in anticipation of
disasters but, for major events, there is often a
massive inflow of assistance from the international
community. Often, though, the supply of external
financing does not match recovery needs and, thus,
there are sectoral and geographical financing gaps.

Reconstruction can be delayed if
adequate financing is not available:
This can be overcome by: (a)
reconfiguring existing projects and
programs in the disaster-affected
area; (b) drawing on government
sources of standby financing; and
(c) mobilizing external assistance
from donors and NGOs that can
flow outside of the government
budget to support government
policies and programs.

2.1.3. Accelerating the Speed of Recovery
The pace of reconstruction can be hindered or
hampered depending on how well partnerships are
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managed. For example, the lack of local-national
coordination in the initial post-Hurricane Katrina
response was later reflected in various aspects of the
recovery phase and contributed to making rapid
reconstruction problematic. On the other hand,
countries that have established effective coordination
mechanisms for local, national and even international
coordination have fared better in implementing a
swifter recovery, e.g. the role played by the Recovery
Agency (BRR) in Aceh.
•

Lessons
o

o

Coordinate partnerships: A multitude
of well-meaning partners may want
to contribute to the recovery process
but, if uncoordinated, they can work
at cross-purposes. These potential
roadblocks to speedy recovery can
be overcome by formal and informal
coordination mechanisms.
Incorporate disaster risk reduction:
Resilience to the next disaster can
be increased at a relatively low cost
by building disaster risk reduction
into the recovery process, including
greater public awareness, early
warning systems, more resilient
infrastructure, more responsive
services, better siting of facilities,
and institutional coordination for
disaster response.

2.1.4. Strengthening Institutions for Recovery
Management
Local institutions often suffer from severely reduced
capacity following disasters, often losing staff,
buildings, equipment, and records as happened in
Aceh. National institutions can be similarly affected
from catastrophes, as was the case following the
January 2010 earthquake in Haiti. In order to ensure
the long-term sustainability of recovery and ensuing
development, partnerships must incorporate a focus
on strengthening institutional capacity.
•

Lessons
o

Involve local authorities: Local
governments, along with
communities and NGOs, are often
the first-responders following a
disaster and they are accountable
for eventual management of the
reconstruction process. Strong local
governments should be
acknowledged leaders in the
recovery while weaker local
governments may require significant
capacity building. When
reconstruction is “handed over” from

stronger partners to local
government, the local authority must
be prepared to receive, manage and
maintain assets that are being
transferred.
2.2. Haiti
Haiti was struck by a 7.0 magnitude earthquake on
January 12, 2010, with its epicenter only 25 west of
the capital, Port-au-Prince. The government
estimated that 316,000 people were killed, more than
300,500 people were injured and up to 1.5 million left
homeless (2010 Haiti earthquake, n.d.), making it the
largest urban disaster in recent world history.
Prior to the disaster, Haiti was already the poorest
country in the Western hemisphere with a fragile,
with a history of fragile, often unstable governance.
The earthquake damaged or destroyed 60% of the
country’s administrative and economic infrastructure,
20% of its schools and 50% of its hospitals (2010
Haiti earthquake, n.d.; Office of the Special Envoy for
Haiti, 2012). The official post-disaster needs
assessment estimated the value of damage and
losses at $7.8 billion, slightly higher than the
country’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 2009
(Government of Haiti, 2010). Seventy per cent of
these losses were suffered by the private sector, with
housing being the most severely affected sector.
Days after the earthquake, the author was asked to
advise the Latin America/Caribbean team at the
World Bank on options for establishing a multi-donor
fund for recovery, based in part on the Aceh
experience. After two months of discussion and
planning, the World Bank was asked to establish the
Haiti Reconstruction Fund (HRF) and I became its
manager in May 2010. The HRF has now raised
almost $400 million of which three-quarters has been
used to finance twenty strategic reconstruction
projects (HRF, 2013). The following lessons are
drawn from that experience.
2.2.1. Designing Development Finance
Prior to the earthquake, Haiti was emerging from a
long history of poverty, inadequate governance,
uneven foreign assistance, corruption, and instability.
The disaster exacerbated all of these factors. These
challenges had to be taken into consideration when
the HRF was designed so that it could operate
effectively in a very difficult post-disaster
environment.
•

Lessons.
o

Table 2 summarizes the key issues
that were faced, the needs that
arose from the challenges and the
lessons that were applied in the
design of the HRF.
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Table 2. Design factors that enable the HRF to operate
effectively in Haiti
Issue

Need

Design Lessons

Damage from
earthquake affected
every sector of
society and
economy

Ability to respond to a
wide range of
reconstruction needs,
including budget
support

Government
capacity seriously
weakened at all
levels

Build capacity and
authority by putting
the Government in a
leadership role

History of corruption
and inefficiency

Need for transparent
and accountable
procedures

Diversify by working
with Partner Entities
that have a broad
set of comparative
advantages (IDB,
IFC, UN, World
Bank)
Reinforce national
leadership: the
Haitian Government
chairs HRF
Steering Committee
and sets the
priorities for
financing
Minimize risks by
controlling financial
flows: funds flow
through Partner
Entities who
appraise and
supervise each
activity
Enhance quality by
using the policies
and procedures of
the Partner Entities,
embodying
international
standards, for each
activity

Previous aid did not
always produce
sustainable, highquality results

Many reconstruction
needs are urgent

Capacity to
implement is
hampered by many
factors

Apply international
good practice for
project design,
financial
management,
procurement,
environmental and
social safeguards,
monitoring, etc.
Ability to make
funding decisions and
transfer resources
quickly
Need to work with
entities that have a
proven capacity to
deliver results

Improve efficiency
and response
capacity by
adhering to tight
performance
standards
Increase flexibility
by allowing
financing to go to a
range of
implementing
agencies (Govt.,
NGOs, UN, private
sector, etc.)

implementing development finance in a
fragile, postdisaster context:
o

Streamlined procedures facilitate a
rapid response: Because the HRF has
efficient procedures, tight performance
standards,
good
lines
of
communication, and a decision-making
process that is coordinated with the
government, it can respond quickly to
new policy initiatives and requests for
financing. This was evidenced in July
and August 2011 when the HRF
received, reviewed, allocated, and
transferred US $30 million in a month to
kick-start President Martelly’s flagship
“16/6” camp resettlement program.

o

Working through Partner Entities
ensures that funds are effectively spent:
The HRF’s Partner Entities apply
international standards of good practice
in financial management, procurement,
environmental and social safeguards,
project design, and monitoring and
evaluation for the use of HRF financing.

o

An
efficient
structure
minimizes
administrative costs: The HRF has one
of the lowest expense ratios (under 5%)
of any postdisaster multidonor trust
fund. This can be attributed to wellestablished Partner Entities, a modestly
sized Secretariat, an efficient Trustee,
and a clear division of labor between
them.

o

Government
leadership
poses
tradeoffs: the HRF has clearly benefited
from the Government of Haiti’s
leadership in chairing its Steering
Committee and setting priorities for
financing. The downside is that
government instability resulted in a
slower pace of allocation as priority
setting and replacement of the IHRC as
the HRF’s counterpart have proven to
be challenging for the GoH when
legitimacy is in doubt.

o

An independent governance structure is
invaluable: The HRF was able to
continue operations during a period of
political instability in Haiti in part
because it has a governance structure
that is independent. Thus, while the
IHRC stopped functioning after the
expiration of its mandate, the HRF
Steering
Committee,
Secretariat,
Trustee, and Partner Entities continued
to operate.

Source: HRF, 2011

2.2.2. Implementing Development Finance
The HRF was designed in early 2010 using the
lessons and design elements listed in Table 2. It
then became operational in mid-2010 after the first
contributions were received and the government,
along with the international community, had
established a reconstruction coordination body
known as the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission
(IHRC). The IHRC was the HRF’s counterpart for its
first 18 months until the Commission’s mandate
expired. The counterpart role then took on a more
conventional tone in the form of the Ministry of
Planning
and
External
Cooperation,
an
arrangement that continues to the present day.
Lessons
•

Thus, the HRF has nearly four years of
operational experience during which the
following lessons were learned about
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o

o

A return to “normal” arrangements was
warranted: The lengthy process of
agreeing on a new counterpart and
procedures resulted in a system that
relies
on
normal
government
procedures and institutions. While more
time consuming than the initial
arrangements with the IHRC, this
should strengthen GoH capacity as well
as the legitimacy and ownership of
financing requests to the HRF.
Donor preferencing poses tradeoffs: On
the positive side, the expression of
preferences by some donors about the
use of their contributions increased the
total amount of funding available to the
HRF. On the downside, reserving funds
in order to guarantee that preferences
are met has reduced the flexibility and
availability of HRF financing and is at
odds with the goal of enhancing
government ownership as well as
alignment with government priorities.
(HRF, 2012; 2013)

2.3. South Sudan
South Sudan is the world’s newest country,
achieving independence from Sudan in 2011. The
signature of a comprehensive peace agreement
(CPA) in 2005 ended five decades of war which cost
over two million lives. Since then, South Sudan has
experienced relative peace, though it remains
deeply fragile. Exacerbated by its historical and
geographical isolation, the period of heightened
tensions between South Sudan and Sudan, and
internal episodic violence, the legacy of economic
underdevelopment,
and
institutional
deficits
contribute to the fragility of the country. The
governance structures are largely concentrated in
former garrison towns such as the capital of Juba in
a landlocked area about the size of Afghanistan with
a population of 11.8 million people (Knopf, 2013). In
mid-December 2013, tribal violence erupted once
again.
Despite South Sudan’s great resource wealth, its
population is one of the most deprived, with
extremely poor social indicators and dramatic
gender disparities. Outside a few oil enclaves and
underutilized fertile soils, South Sudan remains a
relatively undeveloped subsistence economy. Oil
revenues are also associated with poor governance
and corruption, which have started to color the
population’s perceptions of their state and threaten
to undermine its legitimacy. The most significant
stress factors include: possible future tensions with
Sudan; internal conflicts resulting from contestation
among different social and economic groups over

access to power, resources, and services;
ineffective governance, corrupt public financial
management, continued draining of oil revenues
without capital investment or improved welfare;
underdevelopment of the nonoil economy; and
extreme economic deprivation of the population
(World Bank, 2013b).
In mid-2013, the author was asked to advise the
Africa region of the World Bank with options for
creating a partnership fund to help finance
development and capacity-building initiatives in
South Sudan. In September 2013, the GRSS asked
the World Bank to design a South Sudan
Partnership Fund (SSPF), and I was named to head
the design team. Work on the design process, along
with most development assistance, came to a halt
in mid-December 2013 with the outbreak of ethnic
conflict in various parts of the country that has
continued through the first quarter of 2014.
2.3.1. Designing Development Finance in a Fragile,
Postconflict State
The SSPF is building on the experience gained
during World Bank management of the Multi-Donor
Trust Fund for South Sudan (MDTF-SS) from 2005–
2012. While there were important accomplishments
during this period, the international community
overestimated government capacity and had an
uneven record in building the capability of the
GRSS. Instead, the providers of financial assistance
relied heavily on NGOs for service delivery. Thus,
despite the US $4.2 billion spent during the CPA
period, the assistance did not have the expected
impact on what should have been its priority—
mitigating the sources of conflict in South Sudan
and building systems to ensure that oil revenues
would be used to improve the population’s
economic and social welfare.
Lessons:
•

An evaluation of the South Sudan MultiDonor Trust Fund (Fafo Institute for Applied
International Studies, 2013) drew the
following lessons that were the most
relevant to the establishment of the SSPF:
o

The fund’s governance body must
manage the interaction between
political aspirations and expectations
and fund operations

o

The World Bank has an important
responsibility to assess technical
feasibility against the fund’s contextual
and political reality

o

The recipient execution modality
depends on government leadership and
capacity
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o

The key performance variable is
government leadership, with donors
and the fund aligned behind the
government’s agenda

•

Establishing a division of labor between the
governing body, the SSPF’s administrator,
the Secretariat, government authorities, and
implementing agencies

o

The highest level of the fund’s
governance system should minimize its
involvement in operational details

•

Seeking to use the comparative advantages
of a range of implementing agencies

o

Successful projects have strong
national leadership; are well prepared;
have a simple design and realistic
development objectives, scope and
implementation schedules; and do not
exceed the capacity of national
implementing institutions

•

Anticipating the need to support the costs of
preparing
activities
and
integrating
maintenance issues in the design of
activities.

o

A limited number of activities can be
done “quick and well” while other
projects can only be done “well” with
time

o

Procurement policies need to be more
flexible in response to institutional
capacity constraints, local market
conditions, and other risks

In addition to these South Sudan-specific lessons,
the World Bank has learned from its extensive
global experience about how to improve the design
and operation of partnership funds, especially in
fragile and conflict-affected states (Leitmann, 2013).
Some of these lessons that are applicable to the
SSPF include: (a) design for simplicity with
expectations that are realistic for the context; (b)
clarify the role of each stakeholder at the outset; (c)
engage other development partners such as the UN
and NGOs; (d) draw on and scale up existing
effective operations; (e) prepare for higher
preparation and operating costs in fragile states; (f)
do things in parallel to save time and resources;
and (g) develop a strong communications strategy
The proposed design for the SSPF embodies these
lessons by:
•

•
•

•

Acknowledging government leadership of
the Fund (governing body, secretariat,
preparation of activities) while providing
significant support for capacity building

3. RISK MANAGEMENT FOR FRAGILE AND
CONFLICT-AFFECTED SITUATIONS
3.1. Risk Management Framework
Risk assessments are a key input to the World
Bank’s decision whether or not to go forward with
the preparation of a new investment project
financing operation, helping to determine and
maintain an adequate balance between the
expected results of an operation and its risks. At the
project level, these assessments are a key tool to
(1) identify risks that can be mitigated adjusting the
project’s scope/design to improve the likelihood of
achieving the expected results; (2) define an action
plan to manage the risks, establishing specific risk
mitigation measures as well as capacity-building
activities to address those risks; and (3) determine
the level of Bank implementation support for the
project based on its risk profile. In addition, the riskbased approach is designed to assist in deciding on
the processing speed based on risk and in
allocating resources to the areas that are burdened
with the greatest risk.
A central tool of the risk-based approach is the
Operational Risk Assessment Framework (ORAF).
The ORAF helps managers and all members of
project and country teams look in a systematic,
holistic, and integrated manner and in real-time at
risks to achieving project development objectives
(PDOs). Teams are expected to use the framework
to achieve the following:
•

Supporting a straightforward development
objective and limited set of priority sectors

Identify and describe the most relevant risks
to the project, rate those risks based on
their relevance, and establish management
measures when required;

•

Allowing
for
flexibility
through
the
application of the World Bank’s policies for
fragile and conflict-affected states

Track
progress
regarding
the
implementation and effectiveness of risk
mitigation/risk management measures;

•

Update the ORAF over the life of the
project; and

•

Adjust project design as necessary to
support the achievement of the project
development objectives.

Using a streamlined grant-approval process
with clear and measurable performance
standards
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The ORAF is an integrated and nested risk
framework that pulls together key risk areas that
may affect the achievement of the PDO of an
operation. Four different levels of risks, broken
down into 10 risk areas, are considered under the
ORAF:
•

Stakeholder-level risks: Project teams
assess risks to the Bank’s relations with
borrowers, donors, and other key
stakeholders, who might question or even
oppose the project in a manner that could
affect the achievement of its development
objectives. Project teams need to be aware
and mitigate where possible.

•

Operating environment-level risks: This
level
includes
country
risk
and
sector/multisector risk. These risks are
related to the environment in which the
project operates and not to the PDO.
Project teams need to be aware of these
risks even though they cannot generally be
mitigated by the project. Teams are
expected to take into account the impact of
those operating environment risks on the
development objectives of the specific
project, in the relevant risk section (for
example, the implementing agency-level or
project-level risk).

•

•

Implementing agency-level risks: This level
includes capacity risk and governance risk
(which includes a fraud and corruption risk
sucategory). These risks are related to the
specific agencies that implement the
project. There is scope to influence the risk
level over the course of the project through
mitigation measures and project design.
Given the sensitivity of rating fraud and
corruption, fraud and corruption risks are
treated differently in terms of public
disclosure.

the systems of the implementing agency) and
control risks (project design, budgeting process,
accounting, internal controls, fund flow, financial
reporting, auditing). At the design phase, measures
are integrated to address detected risks. During
implementation, financial management risks are
monitored and addressed during project supervision
(World Bank, 2010; 2011a).

Figure 1. Operational risk assessment framework. Source: World
Bank, 2010, p. 2

3.2. Realigning the Framework for Fragile and
Conflict-Affected Situations
The framework presented in Figure 1 is generic and
needs to be modified for each national or
subnational context. The following areas may
require more attention and emphasis in fragile and
conflict-affected situations:
•

Stakeholder risk: Relations with key
government counterparts may need more
intensive analysis as many FCAS situations
are characterized by frequent changes in
key officials or even entire administrations,
as in Haiti and South Sudan.

•

Operating environment risk: The categories
listed above may need to be supplemented
with political economy analysis (important in
Haiti), the role of religious institutions (a
factor in Aceh), an assessment of ethnic
and tribal conflict (a key issue in South
Sudan),
or
other
context-specific
dimensions of the operating environment.

•

Implementing agencies risk: This is a critical
area for FCAS and a complicated one as
there are likely to be contradictory
mitigating measures. To build capacity, the
speed with which support is provided can
be important. However, moving quickly may
not be possible for risk-averse development
partners that can be more concerned with
controlling the risks of corrupt practices.
These contradictory factors were addressed
in the multidonor funds in Aceh, Haiti, and
South Sudan by introducing rapid

Project-level risks: This level includes
design risk, social and environmental risk,
program and donor risk, and delivery
monitoring and sustainability risk.

Project teams also have the option to identify one or
two additional risks (other risks) that may be
specific to the operation if they are not captured in
the existing list. This framework is presented
graphically in Figure 1.
A separate and ongoing risk assessment is
conducted for project-level financial management
which occurs during project design and
implementation as part of supervision work. This
assessment looks at both inherent risks (the
country’s public financial management system and
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procedures while simultaneously applying
the policies and procedures of international
agencies in keys areas such as financial
management and procurement.
•

Project risks: At the level of individual
investments, the international community
can
apply
special
procedures
for
postdisaster and FCAS settings. For
example, the World Bank has special
policies for development cooperation and
conflict as well as for rapid response to
crises and emergencies that allow for
flexibility in areas like procurement
thresholds, environmental and social
safeguards,
fiduciary
requirements,
retroactive financing, and third-party
implementation.
This
flexibility
was
introduced in both Aceh and Haiti, and is
anticipated for South Sudan.

Realignment may also be necessary in the process
of preparing the risk assessment, especially because
of issues around the availability and quality of
information. Ideally, the ORAF should be prepared
quickly using secondary data. However, in fragile
states, critical data may be missing, necessitating an
investment in primary collection and analysis. For
example, land tenure data in Aceh were lost after the
tsunami so a community land readjudication program
had to be implemented in order to facilitate
reconstruction. This implies that completion of the
ORAF in a fragile context may be more costly and
time consuming than in a “normal” setting.
3.3. Considerations for Implementing the Framework
The World Bank’s Development Committee has
identified six areas that are critical for
operationalizing the findings of the 2011 World
Development Report on conflict (World Bank, 2011b).
These are also relevant considerations for applying
the ORAF in fragile and conflict-affected situations.
They are:
1. Making country strategies more fragilityfocused: An ORAF can be an important input
to guide the preparation of country
partnership strategies by providing needed
information on FCAS-specific risks as well as
mitigation measures.
2. Strengthening partnerships on development,
security and justice: The ORAF should
generate
information
not
only
for
development activities but also concerning
the linkages between development and
security as well as development and justice
reform.
3. Increasing attention to jobs and private
sector development: Here, the ORAF will

need to consider labor-intensive employment
opportunities, “quick win” public- and
community-based job creation and private
sector tools, such as microfinance, solutions
for small- and medium-sized enterprises,
and special economic zones.
4. Realigning results and risk management
frameworks (see previous section)
5. Seeking less volatility in financing: the ORAF
can be especially useful in this area by
identifying
modalities
for
delivering
development assistance to mitigate the risks
of deteriorating governance.
6. Striving for global excellence in fragile and
conflict-affected
states:
International
development partners could improve the
quality of their engagement in FCAS by
institutionalizing the use of the ORAF and by
collaborating in its preparation.
The next consideration is the need to use
assessment tools that can help address the
knowledge gaps that were referenced in the previous
section. The Asian Development Bank suggests that
these include: political economy analysis; postcrisis
needs
assessment;
public
sector
capacity
development
assessment;
private
sector
assessment; social assessment focusing on the
poorest, displaced, marginalized, and vulnerable
peoples; conflict and disaster risk assessment; and
climate risk assessment (ADB, 2012).
A final consideration is that one should not entirely
focus on risks and corresponding mitigation
measures. Postdisaster reconstruction can be an
opportunity to “build back better” by improving on
predisaster conditions while also building resilience
to future calamities (Fan, 2013). This was largely
realized in Aceh but only partially achieved in Haiti.
Similarly, one can pursue specific opportunities for
progress on postconflict settings, for example,
working with champions of reform and seeking to
develop economic capital for development and
capacity building, for example, oil revenues in South
Sudan. Thus, one would want to accompany the
ORAF with an analysis of opportunities using a tool
such as the SWOT (strengths-weaknessesopportunities-threats) assessment.
4. CONCLUSION
The end of 2015 has been established as the
deadline for achieving the Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs). However, the majority of MDG
targets will not be met by that time in fragile states.
However, according to the latest analysis, there are
some signs of progress: 20 fragile and conflictaffected states have now met one or more MDG
targets and another six are on track to do so by the
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2015 deadline. Importantly, 20% of fragile states
have now met the target to cut extreme poverty in
half ahead of 2015 (World Bank, 2013d). It is hoped
that increased use of the ORAF approach can
improve the quality and impact of development
assistance for reconstruction and development in
FCAS and, thus, help to reinforce this positive trend.
ANNEX: Harmonized List of Fragile Situations
1
(FY14).
Country

Average CPIA
Score
(ADB, AfDB,
WB)
Low-income (IDA-eligible)
Afghanistan
2.9
Burundi
3.3
Central African
2.8
Republic
Chad
2.9
Comoros
2.6
DRC
3.0
Congo, Rep
3.2
Cote d’Ivoire
3.1
Eritrea
2.0
Guinea-Bissau
2.7
Haiti
2.9
Kiribati
2.9
Kosovo
3.5
Liberia
3.4
Madagascar
3.1
Malawi
3.2
Mali
3.7
Marshall Islands
2.7
Micronesia, FS
2.7
Myanmar
Nepal
3.7
Sierra Leone
3.3
Solomon Islands
3.2
Somalia
1.2
South Sudan
2.2
Sudan
2.5
Timor-Leste
3.2
Togo
3.1
Tuvalu
2.9
Yemen
3.0
Territories
West Bank and Gaza
Blend (low/middle-income)
Bosnia &
3.6
Herzegovina
Zimbabwe
2.2
Middle Income
Iraq
Libya
Syria
Source: World Bank (2013)

1

Peacebuilding/Peacekeeping Missions
Pb, Pk
Pb
Pb

Pk
Pk
Pb
Pk
Pk
Pk

Pk

Pb
Pb
Pb
Pk
Pk
Pk

Pb
Pb

Pb
Pb
Pb

Fragile situations have either: (a) harmonized average
Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) rating
of 3.2 or less or (b) the presence of a UN and/or regional
peace-keeping or peace-building mission during the past
3 years.
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